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Summary 
Entrepreneurs may be constrained by the law to bequeath a minimal stake to non-controlling heirs. 
The size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms, by reducing the future income they can 
pledge to external financiers. Using a purpose-built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance 
law and data for 10,245 firms from 32 countries over the 1990-2006 interval, we find that stricter 
inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms, while it leaves investment 
unaffected in non-family firms. Moreover, as predicted by the model, inheritance law affects 
investment only in family firms that experience a succession. 
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E-mail: fausto.panunzi@unibocconi.it Recent international evidence highlights the importance of family-owned firms: 45 percent of 
publicly listed international firms are family-owned (La Porta et al., 1999), and even in the 
U.S. family firms’ presence is significant with almost one third of S&P500 firms and 37 
percent of Fortune 500 being family-owned (Anderson and Reeb, 2003, and Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006). Therefore it is not surprising that an increasingly large body of empirical 
literature focuses on the performance of family firms, and in particular by the way in which 
their performance is affected by the intergenerational transfer of control. 
So far, two main problems associated to intergenerational succession in family firms have 
been investigated. First, the heir may not be as talented as the founder or a market 
professional, and this may constrain the firm’s growth and profitability compared to non-
family firms, as argued by Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) and Caselli and Gennaioli 
(2005). Second, infighting among family members may paralyze decision-making or lead to 
underperformance: for instance, Bertrand, Johnson, Schoar and Samphantharak (2008) 
document with reference to Thai family firms that control by a larger number of male siblings 
is associated with lower performance.
1 Indeed, various measures of firm performance (return 
on assets and market-to-book ratios) deteriorate when control is passed from the founder to a 
family descendant (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988, McConaughy et al. 1998, Fahlenbrach, 
2005, and Perez-Gonzalez, 2006). 
In this paper, we concentrate on another reason why succession may slow down a family 
firm’s growth and investment or even lead to its liquidation: the rights that inheritance norms 
confer to non-controlling heirs over the founder’s estate reduce the firm’s ability to pledge 
future income streams to external financiers, and thereby constrain its ability to fund 
                                                 
1 Bertrand and Schoar (2006) note that conflict in the wake of succession is particularly frequent when several 
siblings are involved in the family firm: “cooperation between siblings can be difficult to achieve, despite 
parental will. Even if strong ties originally exist between family members, daily interactions within the context 
of the family business may lead to brutal infighting. Indeed, there are many examples of families (and their 
businesses) ripped apart from such infighting.” (p. 79-80). The negative performance effects of family conflicts 
on business performance are also documented in the business literature on family firms (see for instance Davis 
and Harveston, 2001). 
 1investment. The larger the portion of the founder’s assets to be assigned to non-controlling 
heirs, the lower the fraction left to the heir designated to remain at the helm of the firm. 
Absent any friction in capital markets, a lower wealth of the controlling heir would not affect 
the family firm’ ability to borrow and invest. But in the presence of capital market 
imperfections, it may hinder the firm’s investment. This effect of inheritance law is 
empirically testable, as the heirs’ legal rights over family assets differ widely around the 
world. In countries with a common law tradition, there are no restrictions on the fraction of 
assets that can be bequeathed to any heir. In civil law countries, instead, such legal restrictions 
generally exist, but vary considerably from country to country.  
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we present a model to explain how 
inheritance law and financing constraints should be expected to interact and affect the 
investment and growth of family firms. Second, we measure the extent to which inheritance 
law constrains the intergenerational transmission of wealth within families around the world. 
Third, we take the model’s main prediction to the firm-level data on investment and growth in 
different countries. 
In the baseline version of our model, we consider a firm that the founder bequeaths to his 
children, entrusting control to one of them. The controlling shareholder can appropriate a 
fraction of the cash flow as private benefits at the expense of other shareholders and 
financiers, to an extent determined by the degree of investor protection. The investment that 
the firm can undertake depends positively on investor protection, as more external finance is 
available when private benefits are reduced, and on the controlling shareholder’s wealth, as in 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). By reducing the controlling heir’s wealth, restrictive 
inheritance law can adversely affect the firm’s ability to invest. We show that, when legal 
investor protection is very strong, the firm can finance the first-best level of investment, 
irrespective of inheritance law restrictions. But, as legal investor protection worsens, stricter 
 2inheritance law reduces investment because the resources paid out to non-controlling heirs 
cannot be compensated by external finance. 
We also explore the extent to which these predictions are robust to several extensions of 
the model. First, we show that the presence of an inheritance tax has the effect of reducing the 
investment of family firms. The adverse effect of the inheritance tax on the investment is 
stronger the weaker investor protection. In the baseline model, we assume that the firm’s 
assets can be partially liquidated at no cost. In another extension, we show that our 
conclusions survive under the assumption of inefficient partial liquidation. In this setup, the 
non controlling heir will be given a financial claim over the family firm’s cash flow rather 
than cash. The larger the stake of the non controlling heir, the lower the firm’s ability to raise 
funds on capital markets. Thus, as before, a stricter inheritance law reduces the family firm’s 
investment. The only additional insight is that in this case, if investor protection is very weak, 
the value of the financial claim of the non controlling heir may fall below the minimal 
threshold set by inheritance law. Then the family will be forced to liquidate the entire firm, 
even though this decision does not maximize total family wealth. Inefficient partial 
liquidation adds a new type of inefficiency. We also explore how inheritance constraints 
affect the transition from a family to a non-family firm status. If retaining the firm in the 
family also yields non-monetary benefits of control, and if family firms differ from non-
family ones only for the presence of the inheritance constraint, then the stringency of the 
inheritance constraint makes the family less likely to retain control over the firm. Moreover, 
transition to non-family firm status should be less likely when investor protection is so strong 
that the inheritance constraint has no impact on family firms. 
Our next step is to assess whether the evidence is consistent with the main prediction of 
the model: that family firms’ investment and growth is negatively affected by the limits that 
inheritance law sets to the wealth that can be bequeathed to a single heir (whereas this does 
 3not hold for non-family firms), and that this effect is stronger where investor protection is 
weaker. To perform this empirical test, we collect data on inheritance law for 62 countries, 
mainly via questionnaires sent to law firms that are part of the Lex Mundi project. We 
measure the “permissiveness of the inheritance law” of each country as the maximum share of 
a testator’s estate that can be bequeathed to a single child, depending on the presence or 
absence of a spouse and the total number of children. This maximum share binds the testator’s 
actions, as it cannot be exceeded via inter-vivos donations, with heirs being generally entitled 
to challenge in court donations made in breach of their rights. Inheritance law is also binding 
in another sense: the median household headed by a wealthy entrepreneur features more than 
one child (in almost all the countries for which we have such data), so that in most cases the 
choice of a controlling heir and of his (or her) stake is not a trivial decision.  
We then test the effect of this variable on the investment and growth of family firms, 
using a sample of 10,245 (family and non-family) firms from 32 countries for the 1990-2006 
interval. In our baseline regression, we include fixed country and industry effects, but can still 
identify the effect of inheritance law on investment by exploiting its differential effect on 
family and non-family firms: in line with our model’s predictions, we find that a more 
permissive inheritance law is associated with larger investment in family firms, and that this 
effect is amplified in countries that also feature better investor protection.  
Our second test is based on a methodology similar to that used by Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), suitably adapted to take into account that our data are at firm-level (rather than 
industry-level) and that we are interested in the effect of inheritance law and investor 
protection (as opposed to financial development) on investment.  We regress the investment 
rate of each firm (averaged over the time interval of our sample) on Rajan and Zingales’ 
indicator of financial dependence, interacted with our measure of the permissiveness of the 
inheritance law, with various measures of investor protection, and with the product of these 
 4two variables, controlling for country and industry fixed effects. This methodology allows us 
to test not only whether inheritance law matters for family firms’ investment, but also whether 
it does not matter for non-family firms’ investment. Also this further implication of the model 
turns out to be consistent with the data: the permissiveness of inheritance law enhances 
investment only in family firms. 
To probe the data further, we split the sample of family firms into a group that experience 
succession during the sample period and another group that do not, in line with the idea that 
inheritance laws should be relevant mainly for firms that experience an intergenerational 
transfer of control. The data are consistent with this hypothesis as well. Finally, we estimate a 
panel regression with firm fixed effects using the sub-sample of family firms, and test whether 
their investment declines in the wake of a succession and whether this decline is attenuated in 
countries where inheritance law is more permissive and investor protection is stronger. Also 
these predictions are born out by the data. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we present the baseline model, 
derive its predictions on how inheritance law affects the firm’s investment and the family’s 
liquidation decision for different degrees of investor protection. Section 2 contains various 
extensions of the baseline model, mainly aimed at exploring the robustness of its predictions. 
Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy and reports the 






 51. The model 
We consider a firm that is initially owned by its founder, who has two prospective heirs, 
denoted as 1 and 2.
2 The firm is the combination of physical assets, whose scrap value is 
normalized to 1, and entrepreneurial “know-how”. The founder’s wealth is entirely invested 
in the firm’s physical assets. Only the founder and heir 1 have the know-how to run the firm.
3 
All parties have linear utility and no discounting: they simply maximize their final wealth. 
We assume a perfectly competitive capital market, whose equilibrium interest rate is 
standardized to zero for simplicity. 
 
1.1. Baseline model structure 
We start by laying out the baseline version of the model, leaving extensions to Section 2. The 
model’s time line is shown in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Family succession  
We assume that the firm’s physical assets can be liquidated on a perfect secondary market (at 
their scrap value of 1) and are perfectly divisible (so that partial liquidation is feasible and 
efficient). The assumption that partial liquidation is efficient is made only for simplicity and 
will be relaxed in Section 2.2.  
At t = 0, the founder retires and must choose how much he wants to leave to each of his 
heirs.
4 As the entire family’s wealth is invested in the firm’s assets, the founder liquidates a 
fraction x of them and gives the proceeds to heir 2 (who invests it on the financial market at 
                                                 
2 We take the number of children as given, that is, not determined by rational considerations by the founder. 
3 If both heirs had the same managerial talent, there would be no trade-off in this model. 
4 If one relaxes the assumption that only heir 1 has the talent to run the company, the firm could be sold as a 
going concern to an outside manager at a value that exceeds the scrap value of its physical assets. In terms of our 
example, the founder could not only sell the firm’s assets but also its know-how to an outsider, and distribute the 
sale proceeds among the two heirs. We explore this extension in Section 2.3. 
 6zero rate of return). The remaining fraction 1 x −  of the assets is given to heir 1, who becomes 
the new manager of the family firm. Equivalently, instead of receiving the proceeds from this 
partial liquidation, heir 2 may be given a financial claim of value x over time-2 cash flow, 
such as an equity or debt stake. The two arrangements (partial liquidation or retention of heir 
2 within the investor base) are completely equivalent when partial liquidation is efficient. For 
expositional simplicity, we stick to the first interpretation.  
The founder chooses the split between the heirs, x, so as to maximize their total wealth:
 5 
1 f ww w 2 = + ,       ( 1 )  
The distinctive feature of the model is that the law constrains the founder’s ability to allocate 
the family assets among his heirs. As we shall see in Section 3, in many countries the law sets 
a lower bound on the share of the estate that each heir must receive.
6  We capture this legal 
constraint by assuming that the founder must assign a minimum fraction u of total wealth to 
the non-controlling heir, that is,  , and therefore entitles heir 2 to challenge in court 
any division of the founder’s estate that does not satisfy this condition. Henceforth we shall 
refer to 1  (the maximum fraction that can be bequeathed to the controlling heir) as a 
measure of the “permissiveness of inheritance law”. For instance, a completely permissive 
legislation is one where this measure is 1, so that the controlling heir can inherit the whole 
family firm. 




At t = 1, heir 1 decides how much money to invest and therefore how much funding to raise 
on the capital market. The firm’s investment I is funded by heir 1’s wealth 1 x −  plus external 
                                                 
5 Our objective function ignores the possibility that the founder may have a preference for treating with fairness 
the two heirs. We discuss this point in Section 2.5. 
6 Generally, inheritance laws refer to the value of assets at t = 0 (without incorporating future improvements in 
value). However, our model would not be significantly affected if the fraction u were defined with reference of 
the final value of the firm, taking into account the future gains from investment.  
 7funds that he raises. Investors are given a claim   over the firm’s cash flow. This claim can 
be thought of as debt or non-voting equity. For the sake of clarity, we will stick to the first 
interpretation. Each unit of capital costs 1, and at t = 2 yields revenue1
I R




7  Therefore, the firm’s revenue is 












     (2) 
Clearly, it is inefficient to expand the firm’s capital beyond this maximal scale. To focus 
on the interesting case, the maximal efficient scale is taken to exceed the family’s initial 
wealth, i.e.  1 I > . 
 
Private benefits of control 
At t = 2 heir 1, being in control, decides on the allocation of revenues. The revenues can 
either be paid out to shareholders or diverted as private benefits – either via outright theft or 
more subtly via transactions with related parties, transfer pricing, perquisites consumption or 
excessive salaries. This non-contractible expropriation decision is modeled as the choice of a 
fraction  [0,1] φ∈  of the revenues, so that private benefits are  R φ  and security benefits to all 
claimholders are (1 )R φ − . 
Expropriation of outside investors is limited by the law, which sets an upper bound 
[0,1] φ∈  on the revenues that can be diverted by heir 1. Therefore, 1−
                                                
φ  measures the 
minimum fraction of the firm’s cash flow that the law guarantees to be disgorged in favor of 
investors: accordingly, it will be referred to as the degree of “investor protection” afforded by 
the law. The assumption that the legal degree of investor protection affects external finance to 
 
7 The assumption of a linear production function with an upper bound on investment is made only for simplicity. 
Our results would be qualitatively unchanged if the production function featured decreasing marginal returns.  
 8firms agrees with a large body of evidence (see Beck and Levine, 2005, and Malmendier, 
2007, for two recent surveys ).  
 
1.2. Effect of inheritance law on family firm investment  
We analyze the founder’s problem by solving the model by backward induction: we start from 
the expropriation decision at t = 2 to obtain the investment level I at t = 2, and from this we 
determine the optimal fraction x of the firm’s assets liquidated at t = 0. This yields the 
founder’s welfare and the effect of the inheritance constraint on investment for different 
degrees of investor protection φ .   
At date 2, heir 1 decides how to allocate the revenues. The law constrains him to divert at 
most  R φ  as private benefits. As diversion is costless, heir 1 extracts the maximum benefit 
allowed by the law, φ , so that the firm’s pledgeable income is (1 ) (1 )(1 ) R gI φφ −= −+.  
Since the capital market is perfectly competitive, heir 1 appropriates the entire surplus 
generated by the investment. Moreover, as each unit of investment generates a profit margin 
equal to  , heir 1 wants to invest as much as possible (up to  0 g > I ): investment I  is 
constrained only by the funds that he can raise. The investors’ cash flow rights   cannot 
exceed the firm’s pledgeable income: 
I R
(1 )(1 ) I R gI φ ≤− + . As heir 1 can contributes only 1 x −  
to the firm’s capital, he must raise  (1 ) I x −−  from investors, whose participation constraint 
therefore is  ) 1 ( x I RI − − = . The equality sign follows from the assumption that capital 
markets are perfectly competitive. Investment is maximized when   reaches its highest 
value, which is 
I R
(1 )(1 ) g I φ −+. Taken together, heir 1’s optimal investment choice and the 
investors’ participation constraint imply: 
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) g II x φ −+= − − .     (3) 
 9As in Tirole (2006, Chapter 3), one must distinguish two cases: 
(i) Unconstrained investment: if (1 )(1 ) 1 g φ +− ≥ , a dollar invested in the firm generates at 
least a dollar of pledgeable income, so that there is no upper bound on the external funds that 
can be raised: heir 1 will choose the maximal efficient investment level I .  
(ii) Finance-constrained investment: if (1 )(1 ) 1 g φ + −< , a dollar invested generates less than a 
dollar of pledgeable income, so that heir 1’s ability to finance investment is determined by the 
investors’ participation constraint. Here investment is determined by equation (3): 
(1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )] Ix g φ =− −+ − , and heir 1 can borrow up to 
(1 )(1 )(1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )] xg g φ φ −+− − +− . In other words, for every dollar of his wealth 1 x −  
invested in the firm, heir 1 can borrow an additional amount (1 )(1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )] gg φ φ +− − +− , 
which is increasing in profitability g and investor protection 1 φ − . Moreover, the larger the 
wealth invested by heir 1, the greater his borrowing capacity. Heir 1 will use his entire 
borrowing capacity only if investment is below the efficient scale I . Thus investment is
 8 
        
1
min , .







          (4) 
Equipped with heir 1’s optimal investment at t = 1, now we turn to the founder’s 
succession decision at t = 0 regarding the fraction x of assets to be liquidated to pay heir 2, 
under the inheritance constraint  .   2 wx =≥ u
2
Recall that by equation (1) the founder’s utility is simply the sum of his children’s final 
wealth  . Since heir 1’s utility is his initial wealth, 1 1 ww + x − , plus the profit from the 
investment, that is, 
                                                 
8 When investment is constrained by his borrowing capacity, it is optimal for heir 1 to retain no cash flow right 
in the family firm. This conclusion may seem in conflict with the assumption that he retains control. The 
assumption that cash flow rights and voting rights can be perfectly separated, while extreme, is made only for 
simplicity. In practice, control enhancing devices such as dual class shares may be used by heir 1 to limit the 
fraction of cash flow rights he needs to own to exert control.   
 101
1
(1 ) min ,








and heir 2’s utility is his wealth  , the founder’s utility – and the firm’s final value – is   2 w = x
  
1
1m i n ,








.        (5) 
Since this expression is weakly decreasing in x, the (weakly) dominant strategy for the 
founder is to set x u = , that is, liquidate the smallest amount of the family firm’s assets to 
satisfy the inheritance constraint. We summarize these results in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. If the firm remains under family control, then a fraction u of its assets are 
liquidated, its investment is  { } min ,(1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )] II u g φ =− − + −  and the founder’s welfare is 
{ } 1m i n , ( 1 ) / [ wg I u g φ =+ − − + − 1 ( 1) ( 1 ) ] . f  
This proposition implies that the firm can achieve the efficient level of investment I  if  
1[ 1 ( 1 ) / ] / ( 1 uI g φ −≥−− +) . The unconstrained region defined by this condition is 
represented in Figure 2 as the area above the downward sloping line.  As shown by the figure, 
for any given degree of inheritance law permissiveness 1 u − , there is a sufficiently strong 
degree of investor protection 1 φ −   that the inheritance law imposes no efficiency loss. This 
is most clearly seen in the limiting case of perfect investor protection, 1 φ −= 1 , where the 
previous condition is always met (recalling that  1 I >  by assumption) and we are above the 
vertical intercept in Figure 2: absent agency problems between firm and investors, even a 
controlling heir with a very low amount of wealth can raise externally the funds required to 
invest at the efficient level. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 11If, instead, investor protection falls short of this level, i.e. 1[ 1 ( 1 ) / ] / ( 1 uI g φ ) − <−− + , the 
inheritance law constrains the controlling heir to a suboptimal level of investment: weak 
investor protection prevents him from fully offsetting his low wealth with more external 
funding, and thus  achieve the efficient investment level. In this constrained region, which 
corresponds to the shaded area in Figure 2, (i) a more permissive inheritance law (a greater 
) reduces the share of family assets to be liquidated, and thereby increases investment 
and founder’s utility, (ii) stronger investor protection enhances investment, and (iii) its 
positive effect is larger the more permissive is inheritance law. These results follow from the 
following derivatives being all positive in this region: 
1 u −
















,    
2
2 (1 )







,             (6) 
where for brevity we define  1/[1 (1 )(1 )] kg φ ≡− +− .  
These results are summarized formally in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2. If investor protection is low (1[ 1 ( 1 ) / ] / ( 1 uI g φ ) − <−− + ), then an increase in 
the permissiveness of inheritance law 1 u −  raises the investment of family firms. This effect is 
increasing in the degree of investor protection 1 φ − .  If instead investor protection is high 
(1[ ), an increase in the permissiveness of inheritance law 1  has 
no effect on the investment of family firms. 
1 ( 1 ) / ] / ( 1 uI g φ −≥−− +)
                                                
u −
As these predictions are to be tested empirically later in the paper, it is worth noticing that 
they only apply to family firms: for non-family firms, the effect of inheritance law should be 




9 Of course this does not rule out that the degree of investor protection per se may affect investment also in non-
family firms, insofar as for these firms too face agency problems in the capital market – which however are not 
modelled in this setting. 
 122. Extensions and Robustness of the Model 
In the baseline model just analyzed, we made a number of stark simplifying assumptions. In 
this section, we remove some of them, both to test the robustness of the predictions presented 
so far and to bring out new and interesting predictions of the model. We also briefly discuss 
an issue that we have neglected so far, that is, how inheritance law and shareholder protection 
affect the family’s decision to keep control over the company or sell it out altogether at the 
succession stage. 
 
2.1. Inheritance taxes 
So far we assumed that the founder can bequeath his entire wealth, but in practice in many 
countries the government taxes the founder’s estate upon his death. If we denote by τ  the tax 
rate on bequests, the wealth transmitted by the founder to his heirs is only a fraction 1 τ −  of 
the bequest.
10 The other variable affected by the estate tax is the level of wealth that must be 
assigned to heir 2, which decreases from   to  u (1 ) u τ − .
11  
Going through the same steps as in the previous analysis, it is easy to show that the level 
of investment is  { } min ,(1 )(1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )] II u g τ φ =− − − + − . The tax has two effects on the 
level of investment by family firms: first, it magnifies the region where investment is below 
the first-best level; second, in the region where investment is constrained, it is decreased by a 
factor 1 τ − . To sum up, the main empirical predictions emerging from this analysis are that 
inheritance taxes should reduce the investment of family firms and that the effect of the 
permissiveness of inheritance law on investment is dampened relative to the case where the 
inheritance tax is not present. 
                                                 
c
10 The presence of the inheritance tax may also affect the allocation of consumption across generations, as it 
makes the heir’s consumption more costly. This may translate into greater consumption by the founder, so that 
the wealth transmitted to the heir becomes 1 τ −−
(1 )
, where c is the extra-consumption by the founder.  
11 If there is extra-consumption by the founder, this term becomes uc τ − − .  
 132.2 Inefficient partial liquidation 
So far we have made the extreme assumption that the firm’s assets are perfectly divisible, so 
that any fraction of them can be sold without reducing their liquidation value. In most 
circumstances assets are only imperfectly divisible, i.e., a fraction x of the assets may be 
worth less than x times their value when undivided. Here we consider the opposite case, 
assuming that the liquidation value of any fraction  1 x <  of the assets is zero. 
Inefficient partial liquidation implies that it is never optimal for the founder to liquidate a 
fraction of the assets to compensate heir 2. A more efficient arrangement is for him to satisfy 
the inheritance law constraint of heir 2 by assigning him a financial claim. Since heir 2 is 
entitled to reject any offer that violates his claim, the value of this financial claim must be at 
least equal to u. For instance, heir 2 could be given a debt claim  2 R u =  with a covenant that 
prevents heir 1 from issuing more senior debt. Alternatively, he can be given an equity stake 
if heir stipulates not to dilute its value below u by issuing more equity. 
The only amendment to be made to the model’s time line is at t = 0: if the founder turns 
control over the firm to heir 1, heir 2 is entitled to receive 2 R out of the firm cash flow at t = 2.  
As before, at t = 2 heir 1 will extract all the private benefits allowed by legal protection, that 
is,  (1 ) g I φ + . Anticipating his decision, the investors’ participation constraint at t = 1 is  
1 I R I ≥−, 
which is binding in equilibrium as capital markets are perfectly competitive. This implies that 
all the surplus generated by the investment is captured by heir 1, and since each unit of 
investment generates a positive net present value, he wants to invest as much as possible (up 
to  I ). Heir 1’s funding capacity is limited by his ability to pledge income to outside 
investors: I R  cannot exceed the pledgeable income (1 )(1 ) gI φ −+ minus heir 2’s claim,  2 R . 
Formally,  2 (1 )(1 ) I R gI R φ ≤− + −.
  
 14Combining this constraint with the investors’ participation constraint, we have  
2 (1 )(1 ) 1. gI R I φ −+− = −  
As in the baseline model, we must distinguish between two cases: 
(i) If (1 )(1 ) 1 g φ +− ≥  the firm can raise any amount of funding it wishes, so that it will invest 
I . Heir 2’s inheritance constraint is satisfied whenever  2 R u ≥ . In this case  1 f wg =+I .  
(ii) If instead (1 )(1 ) 1 g φ +− < , the firm’s external funding capacity is limited, and to maximize 
investment, the founder must maximize the income pledgeable to outsider investors. Since 
2 (1 )(1 ) I R gI R φ ≤− + −, the inheritance constraint is binding:  2 R u = . Then the claim that can 
be given to outside investors is  (1 )(1 ) I R gI u φ =− + − , which together with their participation 
constraint yields (1 )(1 ) (1 ) gI I u φ −+= − − .  
It is easy to see that the maximum investment in the constrained regime is again given by 
expression (4), obtained under the assumption of no liquidation costs. The reason is that heir 2 
is just like another outside investor in the family firm. It is as if the family wealth invested in 
the family were only  u − 1 , i.e., heir 1’s wealth. Heir 1’s capacity to raise external funding is 
unchanged, and equal to  (1 ) I u −− .  
Finally, we have to check that heir 2’s participation constraint, (1 ) (1 ) g I φ u + −≥  is indeed 
satisfied.
12 Note that this participation constraint is equivalent to imposing that investment 
satisfies the constraint  1 ≥ I , so that heir 1’s borrowing capacity must be at least u: he must at 
least be able to satisfy the participation constraint of the non-controlling heir, who contributes 
a stake u to the firm.  If  I I =  this constraint is not binding since  1 I > , by assumption.  But in 
the constrained regime, the constraint  1 ≥ I  is satisfied only if 1/ ( 1 u φ ) g − ≥+ . If instead 
1/ ( 1 u φ −< + ) g
                                                
, then the firm’s pledgeable income would not even be sufficient to repay heir 
2 for his contribution to the firm’s investment. In this case, the founder must liquidate the 
 
12 Otherwise heir 2 would force liquidation of the firm’s assets. 
 15company to satisfy the inheritance constraint, so that  1 f w = . This is inefficient, since if the 
company was not liquidated it would have been worth an additional  .  gI
In conclusion, the additional insight from the presence of inefficient partial liquidation is 
that, if investor protection is sufficiently weak, the founder is forced to liquidate the firm, 
since its pledgeable income is insufficient to confer to heir 2 a stake in the family firm whose 
value satisfies the inheritance constraint. 
 
2.3 Sell-out decision 
So far only heir 1 was assumed to be the only agent able to manage the firm after the 
founder’s demise. In this section we relax this assumption by considering outsiders who have 
the same managerial ability as heir 1, and therefore may be willing to buy the firm as a going 
concern.  Since the inheritance constraint limits the firm’s ability to raise external funds, 
selling it out to an external acquirer who does not face the same constraint on investment may 
be more appealing than keeping it within the family. Indeed, if the firm can be sold at its fair 
value, the sell-out option will always dominate when investment would be constrained under 
family management. However, a trade-off arises if the firm cannot be sold at its fair value (for 
instance, because the private equity market is not competitive) or if keeping the firm within 
the family generates an “amenity potential”, that is, a non-pecuniary benefit of control.
13  
Therefore, if the amenity potential is so high as to exceed the firm’s competitive price,  
then obviously the family will retain control. When instead the amenity potential is below the 
firm’s price a tradeoff arises: the family will be ready to sacrifice the amenity potential only if 
                                                 
13 This term was introduced by Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Contrary to the private benefits of control, the amenity 
potential gives utility to the party in control without reducing profits and therefore the firm’s value. For instance, 
the founder may draw pleasure from having his child manage the family firm. Alternatively, in some industries, 
such as media or sports, firm ownership allows the family to be a member of important political or social 
networks. 
 
 16keeping the firm under family control would severely limit its investment, which occurs if 
investor protection is sufficiently poor.  
These results are relevant for our empirical analysis, as they predict that the family firm 
status is itself affected by both investor protection and inheritance law: in a country with 
either weaker investor protection or stricter inheritance law (or both), ceteris paribus, we 
should observe fewer firms under family control. Since this is precisely the parameter region 
where investment is predicted to be more severely constrained, this sample selection should 
bias the evidence against finding an effect of both investor protection and inheritance law on 
family firm investment. However, the amenity potential may happen to be higher in countries 
with strict inheritance law and poor legal investor protection. If indeed this were the case, the 
sample selection bias would tend to boost the effect of inheritance law and investor protection 
on family firm investment.  
 
2.4.  Shared control 
So far, we have maintained that the founder can confer control over the firm only to a single 
heir. What would happen if heirs can share control? To answer this question, consider that 
control has two possible dimensions: (i) ability to extract private benefits and (ii) power to 
decide how much the firm should borrow and invest. 
Suppose first that shared control refers only to the ability to extract private benefits, so 
that heir 2 might be entitled to grab a fraction of these benefits. This assumes that either heir 2 
has an informational advantage over outside investors that allows him to verify private 
benefits extraction, or that heir 1 is altruistic vis-à-vis heir 2 and therefore willingly accepts to 
share the private benefits of control with him. Since private benefits have no deadweight cost, 
the two heirs will agree to extract the maximum benefit (1 )(1 ) gI φ −+ . This will leave the 
firm’s borrowing and investment capacity unaffected, and simply confer a rent to heir 2, in 
 17excess of his legal entitlement u. This argument rests on the premise that the wealth u to 
which heir 2 is entitled by the law refers solely to the cash flow generated by the firm, and not 
to the unverifiable private benefits that he may obtain. 
A more extreme interpretation of shared control is that heirs manage to jointly decide over 
the investment undertaken by the firm. This implies that heir 2 accepts to leave his stake u 
invested in the firm and to pledge the corresponding cash flow to outside investors, so as to 
maximize the firm’s investment. Of course, this presupposes that heir 2 can be confident to 
share in the private benefits of control so as to (at least) recover his investment u. If this 
arrangement can be set in place, the financially constrained level of investment will rise from 
(1 ) /[1 (1 )(1 )] ug φ −− + −  to 1/[1 (1 )(1 )] g φ −+ − , and inheritance law will have no effect on the 
choice of investment. 
Therefore, in this extreme version, shared control completely offsets the effect of 
inheritance law: the empirical prediction is that, if this form of shared control is widespread in 
family firms, one should expect to find no effect of inheritance law on family firm investment. 
This does not rule that shared control may have efficiency costs due to deadlocks and 
disagreements between heirs, and thereby curtail family firm investment below its efficient 
level. However, this investment shortfall will not be systematically related to inheritance law. 
 
2.5.  Fairness in bequest allocation  
Another assumption of the model is that the founder is only interested in the sum of his heir’s 
wealth, and not in its distribution. Indeed, the inheritance distribution computed in the 
benchmark model is inequitable: heir 2 gets a share  1/2 u ≤  of the estate, while heir 1 gets no 
less than 1  (which is what he gets when the firm has zero borrowing ability). Therefore, if 
the founder cares for the fairness of the inheritance allocation, his bequest x to heir 2 will 
exceed the minimum share u prescribed by the law. In the limit, a perfectly egalitarian split of 
u −
 18the estate will require him to set heir 2’s stake at  (1 ) /[2(1 ) ] 1/2 xg g g φ φ = ++ − > , if the firm 
is in the financially constrained region ((1 )(1 ) 1 g φ + −> ): heir 2 must get more than half of 
the cash flow rights, since he is not going to enjoy the private benefits of control. 
Naturally, the more egalitarian is the founder, the greater is the efficiency cost that the 
family must bear in terms of forgone investment: intuitively, the egalitarianism of the founder 
is equivalent to a more stringent inheritance law constraint.  This result highlights a 
potentially important caveat about  the empirical relevance of our model’s predictions: if in 
most countries social norms dictate a greater degree of fairness in inheritance than is required 
by the local law, then family firms investment will reflect differences in the national social 
norms rather than in national laws. However, our empirical predictions will still apply to the 
extent that these social norms have some correlation with inheritance law. This would not be 
surprising since typically the law is initially generated by social custom, as highlighted by the 
history of both Roman and Common law. 
 
 
3. The data 
In our empirical test of the model’s predictions about firm investment we bring together two 
types of data: (i) measures of country-level institutional characteristics, which include novel 
indicators of the permissiveness of inheritance law, and measures of investor protection drawn 
from existing studies; and (ii) firm-level data for investment (capital expenditure), sales, total 
assets, market-to-book ratios, ownership structure (cash flow rights of the blockholder and, 
wherever possible, voting rights) for a sample of companies from 32 different countries. 
 
 193.1. Inheritance law and investor protection data 
To measure the permissiveness of inheritance law around the world, we gathered 
information for 62 countries about the maximum share of the estate that can be bequeathed to 
a single child by a valid will. The data were collected via questionnaires sent to law firms 
belonging to the Lex Mundi association and in some cases from other sources, such as direct 
access to legal sources.
14 The resulting measure is displayed in the first five columns of Table 
1. In each country, this measure varies depending on the presence of a surviving spouse and 
of the total number of children.
15 It should be noticed that this maximum share binds the 
testator’s actions, as it cannot be exceeded via inter-vivos donations. The interdiction of 
donation in breach of heirs’ rights is often explicitly stated by the law, which allows the 
injured party to challenge such donations in court.
16 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 clearly shows that the degree of permissiveness of inheritance law is greater in 
common law countries than in civil law ones: in most common law counties, there is complete 
freedom to leave one’s estate to a single child, irrespective of the presence of a spouse and of 
                                                 
14 We stress that the indicator refers to the maximum share that can be left to a single child conditional on 
writing a valid will, and not to the amount that a child would receive by a parent who dies intestate. 
15 For some countries, inheritance law is so complex that in computing the measure reported in Table 1 we had to 
make more specific assumptions about the case under consideration and/or disregard some clauses in the law that 
could not be captured by our simple indicator. Specifically: (i) for Bangladesh, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 
we assume that heirs are all male, as in those countries male heirs receive twice as much as females; (ii) in 
Canada, we disregarded the case of Quebec, where 50 percent of the estate must go to the spouse of the 
deceased; (iii) for India, where the applicable law depends on the religion of the deceased, we focus on the laws 
applying to non-Muslim citizens; (iv) for Slovakia, we assume that children are over 18 years of age (stricter 
rules apply for children below that age); (v) for Sweden, we disregard that the surviving spouse is entitled to € 
17,750; (vi) in the United States, many states entitle the surviving spouse to an “elective share” which is 
generally 30 percent  but in some states can be up to 50 percent, but we disregarded this norm since it can be 
circumvented by setting up a trust. Moreover, we disregarded the more restrictive laws of the state of Louisiana. 
16 In many countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, France, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, the 
law explicitly states that a gift made between ascendants and descendants or spouses is interpreted as an advance 
payment of inheritance, and cannot deprive heirs of their rights, who can challenge the donation in court. In 
Germany, if an heir is deprived of his/her inheritance may contest such a donation only under certain conditions 
and within specified deadlines. 
 20the number of siblings.
17 In contrast, in civil law countries the law constrains the maximum 
share that can be left to a single child, the more so if the child concurs with a surviving spouse 
and/or other siblings. For instance in Italy, a person with a spouse and two children can freely 
allocate only one fourth of his total wealth, so that he cannot give more than 50 percent of the 
family’s wealth to one child. The figure goes down to 41.7 percent with three children, and 
decreases monotonically to 33.3 percent with six children (not shown in the table for brevity). 
These tighter bounds may not be unrealistic considering the increasing occurrence of 
multiple marriages and the implied number of children. In column (8) we show the median 
number of children of entrepreneurs (defined as self-employed or business owners) who are at 
least 50-years-old and belong to the third or fourth income quartile. While this data is only 
available for 13 countries it clearly shows that the median number of children is never less 
than 2 (with the exception of Sweden where it is 3 children). This confirms that in countries 
where inheritance laws impose constraints on the testator’s will, they will binding for most 
entrepreneurs, in the sense that these will have to take a decision on which child gets control 
and confer him/her a different stake in countries with different inheritance laws.  
That civil law countries have more restrictive inheritance laws is confirmed by Panels A 
and B of Table 2: on average, in civil law countries the largest share that can be left to a child 
in the presence of a surviving spouse is 60 percent if there are two siblings and 54 percent if 
there are three, while in common law countries the corresponding figure is 96 percent in both 
cases. However, Tables 1 and 2 also document that there is considerable variation in the 
figures for civil law countries: for instance, the range of variation is from 33.3 to 100 percent 
for the case of two children and a spouse, and from 25 to 100 percent for the case of three 
children and a spouse. In other words, not all civil law countries are equally restrictive. 
                                                 
17 However, it should be noticed that even in these countries social norms may de facto prevent a testator from 
neglecting altogether one or more of his/her children and his/her spouse. These social norms inspired to a 
minimal standard of equity among potential heirs are sometimes buttressed by judicial practice in some common 
law countries: for instance, in New Zealand a child or a spouse who has been neglected in the deceased will has 
some judicial remedies to redress the situation and obtain a share of the estate. However, there are no general and 
clear guidelines regarding the circumstances in which such judicial remedies can be successfully used. 
 21[Insert Table 2] 
The presence of some dispersion in this indicator within civil law countries is quite 
important if empirically this variable is to play a distinct role from that of a mere indicator of 
the country’s legal origin, and therefore from measures of shareholder protection, which are 
known to correlate highly with the legal origin, particularly with the divide between common 
law and civil law countries: see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 
1998).  Even more encouraging in this respect is that the correlation between the inheritance 
law indicators of Table 1 and measures of investor protection is far less than perfect, as shown 
by Panel C of Table 2. For the case with 2 children and a surviving spouse, the inheritance 
indicator’s correlation with investor protection measures from 0.35 for the anti-director rights 
measure by La Porta et al. (1998) and 0.53 for the self-dealing index by Djankov et al. (2008) 
to 0.19 (and not significant) for the legality index defined by Berkowitz et al. (2003).
18   
 
3.2. Firm-level data 
In the estimation, we rely on data for publicly listed companies from 32 different countries, 
drawn from the set of 16,925 publicly-listed companies in the Worldscope data base over the 
period 1990-2006.  We apply two screens: first, we only keep firms for which we can find 6 
years of financial and accounting data and, second, we remove companies belonging to the 
financial industry. These two screens reduce the sample size to 11,518 companies. We then 
search for the ownership structure of these firms, which forces us to drop other 1,273 firms, 
and yields a final sample of 10,245 firms. 
Ownership information is drawn from various sources. We supplement the rather sparse 
data available in Worldscope with hand-collected data drawn from individual company 
                                                 
18 The Legality index is a weighted average of the legal index variables by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). 
 22websites as of 2007,
19 and for European firms only, with data from the ownership file of 
AMADEUS for 2002. We also check our ownership data against those used by Faccio and 
Lang (2002) for European firms and with those used by Claessens et al. (2000) for East Asian 
firms (from Japan, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand). Finally, when all these 
sources proved ineffective, we contacted individual firms directly to obtain ownership data as 
of 2006 or 2007. We retain observations for companies that exit due to “death”, “delisting” or 
“merger”, so that the sample is not affected by survivorship bias.  
A company is defined as a non-family firm if (i) the ownership sources (Worldscope, 
AMADEUS, Faccio and Lang (2002) and Claessens et al. (2000)) indicate that no individual 
blockholder is present, and (ii) the company’s web site does not indicate that a family 
blockholder is involved in the ownership structure. In our baseline definition, family firms are 
those where at least 20 percent of the cash flow rights
20 are owned by a single family, 
although later we test the robustness of our results to alternative definitions. This baseline 
definition is stricter than the definitions used so far by the literature, and leaves us with 3,288 
firms out of the total 10,245 firms in our sample that are classified as family-owned. 
For family firms, we obtain further information on (i) whether the family blockholder is 
involved in the firm’s active management (defined as either the CEO being a family member 
or the family being present in the firm’s Board of Directors), and (ii) whether there has been a 
succession in the firm during the 1985-2006 interval. We define succession as control being 
handed over to offspring or close relatives of the entrepreneur from the previous generation. 
Such data is obtained by consulting the “company history” segment of the company’s web 
site or, failing this, by contacting the firm. Since it is reasonable to expect that any impact of 
                                                 
19 We drew information on whether the firm’s founding family is still present in the ownership structure and on 
the stake of the family either from the “company history” page or the “investors’ relations” page of the relevant 
company’s web site. If the main shareholder of a company is a foundation or a private firm, we sought 
information on its beneficial owners or controlling family by looking at the respective web sites. If the 
foundation or private firm is controlled by a group of people with the same last name, these are considered as the 
family controlling the company. 
20 We cannot use a cut-off based on voting rights, since for much of our sample this information is not available.  
 23the succession should be felt after the transfer of control occurs, we look for successions also 
before 1990, which is the start year of our financial and accounting sample. Out of 3,288 
family firms, 1,195 firms are found to have experienced a succession over the 21 year period 
from 1985 to 2006. This sample includes 1,021 family firms where the family CEO passed 
control to another family member and 174 family firms where he/she passed control to an 
outside manager. We can also ascertain that 1,552 firms did not have any succession during 
the 1985 to 2006 interval.
21 We could not ascertain succession for 541 family firms.  
Table A1 shows that in the Worldscope data under our definition the breakdown between 
family and non-family firms is fairly consistent with the literature.
22 Family firms are more 
prevalent in civil law countries and less so in common law countries. For example, they 
constitute more than 44 percent of the firms in Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Spain, 
South Korea, Sweden and Taiwan whereas they constitute less than 29 percent of the firms in 
Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, and United Kingdom. These statistics are very similar to 
those reported by Faccio and Lang (2002) for European firms, Claessens et al. (2000) for East 
Asian firms, Setia-Atmaja et al. (2007) for Australian firms, and King and Santor (2007) for 
Canadian firms. Table A2 shows that all sectors are well represented in the sample.
23 In most 
sectors, the breakdown between family and non-family firms is rather balanced, and their ratio 
appears to reflect mainly the importance of the efficient scale of operation and capital 
intensity. The incidence of family firms is larger in sectors with low capital-intensity and 
minimal scale, such as apparel, footwear, furniture, glass, leather, office and computing, paper 
products, pottery and wood products. Conversely, it is lower in drugs, food products, motor 
vehicles, other chemicals, petroleum and coal products, and professional goods. 
                                                 
21 This sample also contains firms that had a succession before 1985.  
22 Companies from the United States are omitted from the sample, since our identifying assumption is U.S. listed 
firms are financially unconstrained, as explained in Section 4. 
23 We map the SIC 3-digit codes of Worldscope into the ISIC codes used by RZ. 
 244. The evidence 
We use a variety of empirical methodologies to test the main predictions of the model in 
Section 1. We start with cross-sectional estimates based on the entire sample of firms, using 
two different specifications: the first of these allows us to test only for the differential effect 
of inheritance law on family and non-family firms’ investment, while the second also allows 
to test for the effect of inheritance law on non-family firms’ investment, which we expect to 
be zero. Then we repeat the estimation separately for a sub-sample that includes only family 
firms that experience succession and another that includes only those that do not. Finally, we 
turn to panel data estimation for the subset of family firms that experience succession, to test 
whether for these firms investment changes around the succession date and whether the 
magnitude of this change is related to inheritance law and investor protection. 
 
4.1. Cross-sectional regressions: entire sample 
 Our first specification provides a simple and direct test of our model, based on the differential 
effect of inheritance law on family and non-family firms.  The dependent variable is the 
average firm-level investment rate over the sample period, defined as the ratio of capital 
expenditure (Capex) to total assets ( jsc I ), where j identifies the firm, s the sector and c the 
country. This variable is regressed on sector effects  s α  (s = 1,…, S) and country effects  c δ (c 
= 1,…, C), on a family firm dummy ( ) jsc F
24 and a set of interactions between this dummy 
and investor protection  c IP , inheritance law permissiveness   and their product  c H cc IPH ⋅ . 
As additional controls, the explanatory variables include the log of the firm’s initial total 
assets,  jsc A , and of its initial market-to-book ratio,  jsc MB , and their interactions with the 
family firm dummy variable. Initial total assets and the market-to-book ratio are respectively 
                                                 
24 This dummy equals 1 if the firm is owned by a family blockholder with at least 20 percent of the firm’s cash 
flow rights and 0 otherwise. 
 25meant to control for the firm’s size and its investment opportunities, and are measured in the 
first year for which data are available in Worldscope.
25  Therefore, the specification is: 
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     (7)       
The main testable predictions of the model are that  2 0 >  and  3 0 β β >
H
, that is, the 
permissiveness of inheritance law   has a differential impact on family and non-family 
firms, both directly and through its interaction with 
c
c IP . Owing to the presence of both family 
and non-family firms in our sample, this methodology allows us to identify the effect of these 
legal variables through their differential impact on these two types of firms, while controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity at the country and industry levels via fixed effects.  
We show the estimates of this regression in Table 3, where standard errors are corrected 
for clustering at the country level. In each column of Table 3, the degree of investor 
protection  c IP  is measured by a different index: (a) the revised anti-director rights index of 
LLSV (1998) in column 1, (b) the self-dealing index of Djankov et al. (2008) in column 2, (c) 
the anti-director rights index of Spamann (2008) in column 3, and (d) the creditors’ rights 
index of Djankov et al. (2007) in column 4. Employing these four different indices allows 
probing the robustness of our results, given that in the literature there is no clear consensus 
about measures of investor protection. We also include a measure of creditor rights protection 
because debt finance is an important source of finance for family firms.  
[Insert Table 3] 
The most important result in Table 3 is that inheritance law permissiveness has a strong 
positive impact on family firms’ investment compared to that of non-family firms. Three out 
                                                 
25 The data for most of the firms in the sample is for 1990. 
 26of the four coefficient estimates of  2 β  are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level and in all instances the impact is economically significant.  
The second striking result is that the coefficient  3 β  is also positive and significant, 
implying that the effect of inheritance law permissiveness on family firm investment (relative 
to that of non-family firms) is amplified by the strength of investor protection. The estimate of 
3 β  is statistically significant at the 5 percent level when investor protection is measured by 
the self-dealing index (column 2) and at the 10 percent level when measured by the anti-
director rights index (columns 1 and 3), while it is not significant when we rely on the 
creditors’ rights index.  
In most cases the impact of inheritance law permissiveness on family firms’ investments 
is also economically significant. To understand its economic magnitude, we consider an 
increase of the index of inheritance law permissiveness from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile, 
that is, from 0.625 to 1, which is twice the standard deviation of the inheritance law index in 
our sample, in a country with the mean level of self-dealing index (which in our sample is 
Belgium, whose index is 0.54). This change in inheritance law permissiveness will increase 
Capex ratio of family firms by 1.5 percent, an increase of more than 16 percentage points in 
the mean Capex ratio of family firms.
26 Similar impacts, albeit lower in magnitude, are 
obtained when we use the two anti-director rights indices and the creditors’ rights index to 
measure investor protection. 
The other estimates in the table show that family firms tend to have higher investment 
than non-family firms, though the difference is not statistically significant, and that this 
difference increases as investor protection improves, although this result is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent confidence level only when we use the revised anti-director rights 
                                                 
26 To obtain this economic impact we use the estimates of the two interaction terms that include inheritance laws 
(β2 and β3). 
 27index of LLSV (1998) and the self-dealing index of Djankov et al. (2008). The estimates also 
indicate that firms’ initial assets and initial investment opportunities increase investment, but 
that these variables do not differentially affect family and non-family firms’ investment. 
A limitation of the specification of Table 3 is that it allows us only to gauge the 
differential impact of inheritance laws on family relative to non-family firms, but not to 
estimate the impact of inheritance laws on non-family firms, which by our model should be 
zero. Testing this hypothesis would require including inheritance law among the regressors, 
which is not feasible in this specification, because this variable is perfectly collinear with the 
country effects. To investigate this further prediction, and at the same time take into account 
that according to our model   and  c H c IP  should affect family firms only if these are 
financially constrained, we employ a second specification. This is based on the approach 
proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) – henceforth RZ – suitably adapted to take into 
account that our data are at a different level of aggregation (firm-level as opposed to industry-
level) and that we are interested in the effect that inheritance law and investor protection (as 
opposed to financial development) have on firm investment. RZ construct their test by first 
identifying each industry’s need for external finance from firm-level data for the U.S., under 
the assumption that financial development is highest in that country. Then they interact this 
industry-level “external dependence” variable with a country-level proxy for the degree of 
financial development (so as to obtain a variable that measures the extent to which financial 
development constrains the growth of each industry in each country) and use this interacted 
variable in a regression for industry-level growth. Financial dependence measures each 
industry’s need for external finance from U.S. firm-level data, on the assumption that for U.S. 
listed firms access to financial markets is not an obstacle to investment. Thus, differences 
across U.S. firms in reliance on external finance reflect primarily differences in the demand 
for funds due to differences in technology. The methodology rests on the assumption that 
these technology-driven capital requirements vary across industries but not across countries. 
 28In our context, the main advantage of this methodology is that, by interacting legal 
variables with the sectoral index of financial dependence ( s D ), it allows us to identify the 
coefficients of these variables for both family and non-family firms, while still including fixed 
effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the country and industry level. More 
specifically, the equation to be estimated includes a set of interactions of financial dependence 
s D  with investor protection  c IP , inheritance law permissiveness   and their product  c H
cc IPH ⋅ , beside the variables in (7): 
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Set in the context of specification (8), the testable predictions of our model are twofold: 
not only  2 0 β >  and  3 0 β >
7 0
, that is,   should have a larger impact on family than on non-
family firms, but also 
c H
β =  and  8 0 β = , meaning that   should have no impact on non-
family firms. Yet another prediction that can be tested is whether financial constraints affect 
the investment of the two groups of firms, by looking at the coefficients of 
c H
c IP : specifically, 
6 0 β >  and  16 0 β β +>  would respectively indicate that both non-family and family firms are 
financially constrained, respectively, and  1 0 β >  that the financial constraints faced by family 
firms are more stringent than those of non-family ones. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Table 4 confirms the central results of Table 3. The interaction between the family firm 
dummy, financial dependence and inheritance law permissiveness has a positive and 
significant coefficient ( 2 0 β >
3
), and the same is true of the interaction of these three variables 
with investor protection ( 0 β > ). In other words, the permissiveness of the inheritance law is 
 29more favorable for the performance of family firms, relative to non-family firms, in countries 
where investor protection is stronger. 
The value added of the estimates in Table 4 is that they show that the interaction terms 
that include inheritance law but exclude the family firm dummy are not significantly different 
from zero, that is, the hypotheses  7 0 β =  and  8 0 β =  cannot be rejected. This is as expected: 
inheritance law matters only matter for family firms, whose effect is already controlled for by 
the terms whose coefficients are  2 β  and  3 β . 
To gauge the overall economic significance of the estimated effect of inheritance laws on 
family firms, we consider an increase in the index of inheritance law permissiveness from the 
25
th to the 75
th percentile, that is, from 0.625 to 1, which is twice the standard deviation of the 
inheritance law index in our sample. We assess the overall impact on family firm investment 
using the estimates shown in column 2 of the interaction terms that include inheritance law 
permissiveness and the family firm dummy ( 2 β ,  3 β ,  7 β  and  8 β ). This exercise is performed 
for an industry with the mean level of financial dependence (0.31) and a country with the 
mean level of self-dealing index (0.54). Such a change in inheritance law permissiveness is 
estimated to increase the Capex ratio of family firms by almost 1.8 percent, which is more 
than 19 percentage points of its mean. Similarly, the estimates in columns 1, 3 and 4 imply a 
14.5, 15 and 8 percentage points increase in family firms’ investment, respectively. 
In addition, the positive and significant estimate of the coefficient  6 β  of the interaction 
between financial dependence and investor protection indicates that an improvement in 
investor protection promotes investment in both types of firms. The evidence that the 
financial constraints are more stringent for family firms is rather tenuous, since the coefficient 
1 β – though positive – is rather imprecisely estimated in most specifications,  
 30Finally, the estimates of Table 4 confirm that, consistent with our findings in Table 3, 
family firms tend to have higher investment than non-family ones (though again the 
difference is not statistically significant) and that the coefficients of both initial assets and 
market-to-book ratio are positive and significant, as expected. 
 
4.2. Cross-sectional regressions: family firms with and without succession 
The impact of inheritance laws on family firms’ investments should occur around the 
intergenerational transfer of control, when entrepreneurs typically allocate stakes to their 
controlling and non-controlling heirs. Hence, we expect the impact of inheritance laws to be 
stronger in family firms that experience a succession during the sample period. To test this 
prediction, we divide the sample of family firms into those that experienced a succession (a 
control transfer from the entrepreneur to his/her offspring or immediate relatives) between 
1985 and 2006, and those that did not. In our sample we have 1,025 family firms that 
experienced succession, 1,548 firms that did not and 541 firms for which we were unable to 
obtain any information. This means that almost a third of our family firms experienced a 
succession, by which control was handed over to another family member. We also have 174 
family firms where control was transferred to a professional manager. 
Our model predicts that the effect of inheritance law should be concentrated in the sample 
of family firms that experienced succession in the sample period. To this purpose, we re-
estimate the RZ specification shown in Table 4 before, but separately for family firms that 
experienced succession (Panel A) and those that did not (Panel B). The sub-sample used in 
Panel A is obtained by removing from the sample those family firms (a) that did not 
experience succession, (b) for which we have no information on succession, and (c) for which 
succession occurred but control was handed over from a family member to an outside 
manager. This leaves us with a sample of 7,982 firms, formed by family firms experiencing 
 31succession plus all the non-family firms. The sub-sample in Panel B instead excludes all 
family firms that experienced a succession where control was handed over to another family 
member, and therefore comprises the family firms not experiencing succession plus all the 
non-family firms. We estimate both specifications (7) and (8), but for the sake of brevity 
Table 5 only reports the results obtained with specification (8): the estimates obtained with (7) 
are very similar. 
[Insert Table 5] 
The coefficients  2 β  and  3 β  of the two interaction variables that include inheritance law 
permissiveness are almost all statistically significant at conventional confidence levels and 
economically large for family firms that experience succession. Instead, for family firms 
without succession they are smaller and less precisely estimated. This result shows that the 
driving force behind our results in Tables 3 and 4 is the sub-sample of family firms that 
experience succession. Also the coefficient  6 β  of the interaction between financial 
dependence and investor protection confirms the finding in Table 4 that firms are subject to 
financing constraints, but now the estimate of  1 β  shows that the magnitude of the relevant 
coefficient is larger for family firms with succession: family firms face tighter financing 
constraints around succession, so that an improvement in investor protection promotes their 
investment the most. 
 
4.3. Panel regressions: family firms before and after succession 
Yet another way of investigating the impact of succession on family firm investments is to 
analyze the difference between capital expenditure before and after such an event. Our model 
predicts that in family firms experiencing a succession investment should decrease more in 
countries with restrictive inheritance laws.  
 32As a preliminary step to gauge how inheritance law affects the pattern of investment 
around the succession date, in Figure 3 we plot the average Capex ratio for the 1,025 family 
firms that experienced both succession and handover of control to another family member, 
separately for a sub-sample of firms where inheritance law is relatively permissive (above-
median permissiveness) and another sub-sample where it is not (below-median 
permissiveness). The figure shows that firms in countries with relatively rigid inheritance law 
experience a larger drop in investment than those in countries with more permissive 
inheritance law. More precisely, in countries with rigid inheritance law, mean Capex ratio 
drops from 8.4 percent in the five years before succession to 6.3 percent in the subsequent 
nine years – the difference being significant at the 10 percent level. In contrast, in countries 
with permissive inheritance law the mean Capex ratio drops only from 9.6 percent to 8.8 
percent, and the difference is not statistically different from zero. This suggests that the effect 
of inheritance law permissiveness on family firm investment occurs precisely around the time 
of succession. 
[Insert Figure 3] 
To investigate this point in a panel estimation framework, we define a firm-level 
“succession dummy” variable  , which for each firm j equals 1 during and after the 
succession and 0 for previous years, and estimate two specifications. The first is: 
jt S
( 12 3 4 jt j t c c c c jt ) I IP H IP H S δδ φ φ φ φ = ++ + + + ⋅ ⋅ ,        (9) 
where  j δ  are firm fixed effects and  t δ  are calendar year effects, while the second one is 
based on the RZ methodology: 
      () 12 3 4 jt j t s c s c s c c jt I DI P DH DI PH S δδ φ φ φ φ = ++ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ .    (10) 
 33In both specifications, the dependent variable is the ratio of Capex of firm j in year t to its 
Total Assets in year  1 t − , while all other variables are defined as in previous expressions.  
We estimate these regressions on two samples. First, we concentrate on the sub-sample of 
1,025 family firms that experienced succession and where control was handed over to a 
family member.
27 Second, we use the whole sample of family firms, removing only those for 
which (a) we have no information about the occurrence of succession or (b) succession 
occurred but led to a control transfer to an outside manager. In this second approach, the 
sample consists of 2,573 family firms. For the sake of brevity, in Table 6 we present only the 
results from the sample of family firms with succession: the results that we obtain with the 
larger sample are similar, and indeed are statistically and economically stronger.  
[Insert Table 6]  
Succession has a strong and significantly negative impact on family firm investment 
( 1 0 φ < ). The impact is economically significant: succession leads to a decrease of investment 
by around 16 percentage points. But inheritance law permissiveness is found to mitigate this 
negative impact of succession on family firm investment (or, equivalently, its strictness 
exacerbates this negative impact), as shown by the fact that the estimated coefficient  3 φ  is 
positive and precisely estimated. The estimated coefficient  4 φ  for the triple interactive term is 
also positive but is significant only when we use the revised anti-director rights index (at the 
10 percent level) and the self-dealing index (at the 5 percent level). The mitigating influence 
of inheritance laws is considerable: taking together the impact from both coefficient estimates 
we find that an increase in inheritance law permissiveness from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile 
decreases the negative impact of succession by more than 13 percentage points.  
                                                 
27 Hence, we remove family firms with succession where control was passed to an outside manager. 
 34Better investor protection is found to exert a similar mitigating influence on the post-
succession investment drop. To gauge the overall impact, one must add the estimated 
coefficient of the succession dummy, 1 φ , that of its interaction with investor protection,  2 φ , 
and that of the interaction with investor protection and inheritance law permissiveness,  4 φ . 
For example, increasing investor protection (using the self-dealing index) by one standard 
deviation away from its mean decreases the negative impact of succession by almost 7 
percentage points. This mitigating effect, though precisely estimated only when using the 
anti-director rights index and the self-dealing index, is consistent with the view that higher 
investor protection allows family firms to suffer less from the increased stringency of 
financial constraints around succession. 
 
4.4. Robustness checks 
Finally, we perform a variety of robustness checks of the empirical results reported so far. 
First of all, we investigate whether our results are robust to the use of sales growth as the 
dependent variable rather than capital expenditure, as our model implies that inheritance law 
also affects family firms’ growth. We require data on sales for at least seven consecutive 
years, so that missing data reduce the number of family firms to 2,191 and of non-family 
firms to 5,468. We report the results using sales growth as the dependent variable in Table 7. 
For sake of brevity we only show the results obtained with specification (8) but similar results 
are obtained with (7).  
[Insert Table 7] 
For the main coefficients of interest, most of the estimates in Table 7 are more imprecise 
and smaller in size than those obtained in Table 4. But the important result in the context of 
this paper is that the coefficient estimates of the interaction between the family firm dummy, 
 35financial dependence and inheritance law permissiveness are positive and are both statistically 
and economically significant, confirming the results obtained for investment in Table 4. 
Increasing the index of inheritance law permissiveness from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile 
increases family firms’ growth by 9 to 12 percentage points. The estimates of the interaction 
between the family firm dummy, financial dependence and investor protection in the second 
row are positive but in general they lack statistical significance, implying that the growth in 
family firms is not more sensitive to improvements in investor protection than that of non-
family firms. Also the estimated coefficient of the interaction between financial dependence, 
inheritance law permissiveness and investor protection is not significantly different from zero.  
We conclude by performing four other robustness checks of the results obtained in Table 
3 and 4. Their results are shown in Table 8.  
[Insert Table 8] 
In Panel A, we control for the effect of the tax rate on bequests, using data for the top 
marginal transfer rate from parent to children from the Coopers and Lybrand International 
Tax Summaries.
28 This variable may be a rather imprecise measure of the actual inheritance 
taxes paid on the estates of entrepreneurs’ families, due to the considerable amount of tax 
evasion and avoidance of inheritance taxes that is possible in many countries. We adapt 
specification (8), by adding a new interaction term between the family firm dummy, financial 
dependence and inheritance taxes. Second, and in accordance with the model, this variable is 
also entered interactively with financial dependence, since inheritance taxes are predicted to 
compress investment only for financially constrained firms. The main impact of introducing 
inheritance taxes is that, while the results for  2 β  and  3 β  remain largely unchanged, their 
statistical and economic significance decreases relative to that in Table 4. The estimates in the 
                                                 
28 These data were kindly provided by Antoinette Schoar. 
 36fourth and fifth rows show that the effect of inheritance taxes on investment is negative and 
larger for family firms, consistently with the model, though not significant even for them.
29 
In Panel B, we perform a second robustness check, where we consider investment in 
family and non-family firms only in civil law countries, to counter the possible criticism that, 
given the correlation between our inheritance law index and common law countries, the   
inheritance law index is essentially capturing the difference between common law and civil 
law countries. Panel B of Table 7 shows that the main results from Table 4 survive even when 
we restrict the sample to firms in civil countries alone, although with two differences: the size 
and precision of the estimate of  2 β  are smaller than those obtained with the full sample, and 
the estimate of  3 β  is no longer statistically significant. This is to be expected, since the 
variability in the inheritance law index is greatly reduced when all common law countries are 
removed from the sample. Even so, it is important to note that the main difference in which 
family and non-family firms respond to inheritance laws remain largely unchanged. 
In Panel C we investigate the robustness of our results to different definitions of family 
firms. Recall that in earlier tables family firms were defined as those where a family owns at 
least 20 percent of the firm’s cash flow rights. However, one can either use a more or less 
restrictive definition of a family firm. The results should become stronger when using a more 
restrictive definition of a family firm, as this reduces the likelihood that coefficient estimates 
be contaminated by the presence of non-family firms mistakenly classified as family firms. In 
Panel C we use two different family firm definitions: a more restrictive one, which requires 
the family blockholder not only to own at least 20 percent of the cash flow rights but also to 
participate in the firm’s active management either by holding the CEO position or by having 
                                                 
29 We also test another prediction by the model – that the effects of inheritance law and investment protection are 
lowered by the presence of inheritance taxes – by splitting the sample and re-estimating the specifications of 
Table 4 separately for the countries where the inheritance tax rate is below and above the median in our sample 
of countries. The estimated coefficients do not significantly differ across these two sub-samples. The results are 
not shown here for the sake of brevity. 
 37members on the board of directors; and a less restrictive one, which requires the family 
blockholder to own at least 5 percent of the cash flow rights.  
In line with expectations, the results in Panel C.1 (with a more restrictive definition of 
family firms) are significantly stronger than those in Panel C.2 (where the definition is less 
restrictive). In particular, the coefficient estimate of  3 β  gains in statistical and economic 
significance when we use a more restrictive definition of family firm compared to the results 
shown in Table 4 and loses its statistical significance when we use a less restrictive definition. 
Our last robustness check deals with the definition of financial dependence used in the 
estimation of specification (8). It can be argued that the median U.S. firm in each industry is 
larger than the median firm in the same industry in most other countries. If so, it would be 
more reasonable to use the financial dependence of the median U.S. firm in the same size 
class where the international firm is placed: for instance, one should use the financial 
dependence of the median U.S. firm in the small-firm sub-sample to determine the financial 
dependence of a small firm in the same industry in another country. To do so, we repeat the 
estimation with a size-dependent measure of financial dependence: we split U.S. companies 
present in Compustat into three sub-samples respectively formed by large, medium and small 
firms, and compute financial dependence for the median company in each sub-sample. We 
use the financial dependence determined in this way in Panel D. The basic results obtained so 
far do not change: family firms’ investments continue to be sensitive to the inheritance law 
index, while non-family firms are not. 
   
5. Concluding remarks 
Even though the literature produced by academic research on family firms is vast and rapidly 
expanding, so far very little attention has been devoted to the role that inheritance norms can 
have in constraining their investment and growth. This is surprising, considering that in 
 38contrast to economists, businessmen are keenly aware of the problem, the more so as the 
impact of inheritance law on family firms has been exacerbated in recent years by the 
increasing shift from the traditional family to extended families, with children being born in 
different marriages or out of wedlock. For example, in Italy family firms are advocating a less 
stringent inheritance law: in the words of a family entrepreneur, “today the family is no longer 
what it used to be sixty years ago: […] it would be obvious to adjust the norms on inheritance 
law, giving to the testator  more flexibility in disposing of his assets”.
30 Similarly, the main 
business newspaper criticizes the restrictiveness of Italian inheritance law: “In the likely case 
where the designated (controlling) heir does not have enough wealth to compensate the other 
heirs, the generational transfer would be possible only when the family firm has a large 
borrowing capacity”.
31 Under the current law, the potential claims of non-controlling heirs are 
so large that they can destabilize even the largest family firms, such as Fiat.
32  
This paper shows that such concerns are consistent with theory and evidence. In the 
context of a stylized model of succession in a family firm, we show that larger legal claims by 
non-controlling heirs on the founder’s estate lead to lower investment by family firms, as they 
reduce the firm’s ability to pledge future income streams to external financiers. We bring this 
prediction to the data, by collecting information about inheritance law in 62 countries and 
building indicators of its permissiveness from the viewpoint of a testator who wishes to 
bequeath the largest possible fraction of his/her estate to a single child. Then we merge this 
novel indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law with measures of investor protection 
and with data for 10,245 firms from 32 countries for the 1990-2006 interval, and find that 
indeed the strictness of inheritance law is associated with lower investment and growth in 
                                                 
30 “E l’eredità? Dev’essere libera”, Corriere Economia, 2 April 2007, page 9. 
31 “Sulla legittima è tempo per i correttivi”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 7 May 2007, page 35. 
32 In June 2007 Margherita Agnelli challenged the inheritance agreement subscribed by all heirs after the death 
of Giovanni Agnelli in 2004 because she regarded it as too penalizing for the children born in their second 
marriage and too advantageous for the children born from her first marriage with Alan Elkann, and especially for 
John Elkann, heir of Giovanni Agnelli as the head of the FIAT industrial and financial empire. Similar legal 
battles have occurred in other prominent business dynasties, such as the owners of Campari, Star, Mondadori and 
Coin, and especially Marzotto.  
 39family firms, while it leaves investment unaffected in non-family firms. Moreover, the 
negative effect of strict inheritance law on family firms’ investment is exacerbated by poor 
investor protection, which is also in accordance with the model. 
 We also find that the results are mostly driven by family firms that experience succession 
in our sample period. It is precisely around and after succession that the effects of inheritance 
laws are mostly felt, because it is at this time that the decision on who is appointed as the 
controlling heir and his/her stake is determined. Indeed we find that during and after 
succession family firms experience a decrease in investment that is more severe for firms 
located in countries with stricter inheritance law. Also in this case, poor investor protection is 
found to exacerbate the effect of strict inheritance law, as well as having a direct negative 
effect on investment. 
Our results are robust to the use of different specifications of the investment equation, to 
the inclusion of inheritance taxes (which have no statistically significant effect on family 
firms’ investments), to different definitions of family firms and different measures of financial 
dependence. Finally, they survive even if the estimation is confined to the sub-sample of firms 
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 Table 1. Inheritance Law Permissiveness and Investor Protection Around the World 
 
Columns 1 to 5 report the largest share of the estate that in each country a testator can bequeath to a single child in 
the absence of a surviving spouse (columns 1 and 2) or in the presence of a surviving spouse (column 3, 4 and 5), 
for different numbers of children. For example, column 1 shows the share that can be bequeathed to a single child 
in the presence of 2 children but no spouse, while column 4 shows the corresponding figure in the presence of 2 
children and a spouse. In column 6, 7 we show the Revised Anti-Director Index and the Self Dealing Index, all 
drawn from Djankov et al. (2006). Column (8) shows the median number of children of entrepreneurs (defined as 
self-employed or business owners) who are at least 50-years-old and belong to the third or fourth income quartile. 
This number is only available for 13 countries, and is drawn from the Health and Retirement Study (U.S.), 
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (U.K.), and Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (other 










































Argentina 0.667  0.556  0.667  0.556  0.5  2  0.34  - 
Australia  1 1  1  1 1 4  0.76  - 
Austria 0.75  0.667  0.833  0.667  0.611  2.5  0.21  2 
Bangladesh 0.5  0.333  0.667  0.333  0.222  -  -  - 
Belgium  0.667  0.5  0.5  0.333  0.25 3 0.54  2 
Bolivia 0.6  0.467  0.8  0.5  0.4  2  0.14  - 
Brazil 0.75  0.667  0.75  0.667  0.625  5  0.27  - 
Bulgaria  1 1  1  1 1 3  0.65  - 
Canada  1 1  1  1 1 4  0.64  - 
Cayman Islands  1  1  1  1  1  -  -  - 
Chile 0.75  0.667  0.75  0.625  0.6  4  0.63  - 
Colombia 0.75  0.667  0.5  0.375  0.333  3  0.57  - 
Costa Rica  1  1  1  1  1  -  -  - 
Croatia 0.75  0.68  0.75  0.68  0.625  2.5  0.25  - 
Cyprus 0.625  0.5  0.625  0.5  0.438  -  -  - 
Denmark 0.75  0.667  0.833  0.667  0.611  4  0.46  2 
El  Salvador  1 1  1  1 1 2  0.43  - 
Estonia 0.75  0.667  0.75  0.667  0.625  -  -  - 
Finland 0.75  0.667  1  0.75  0.667  3.5  0.46  - 
France  0.66 0.5  1 0.66 0.5  3.5 0.38  2 
Germany 0.75  0.667  0.75  0.667  0.625  3.5  0.28  2 
Greece 0.75  0.667  0.875  0.688  0.625  2  0.22  2 
Guatemala 1  1  1  1  1  -  - - 
Hungary 0.75  0.667  1  0.75  0.667  2  0.18  - 
Iceland 0.667  0.556  0.778  0.556  0.481  4.5  0.24  - 
India  1 1  1  1 1 5  0.58  - 
Ireland 1  1  0.667  0.667  0.667  5  0.79  - 
Israel  1 1  1  1 1 4  0.73  - 
Italy 0.667  0.556  0.667  0.5  0.417  2  0.42  2 
Jamaica  1 1  1  1 1 4  0.35  - 
Japan 0.75  0.667  0.75  0.625  0.583  4.5  0.5  - 
Jordan 0.5  0.333  0.667  0.333  0.222  1  0.16  - 
  43Kenya  1 1  1  1 1 2  0.21  - 
Kuwait 0.5  0.333  0.667  0.333  0.222  -  -  - 
Latvia 0.75  0.667  0.75  0.667  0.625  4  0.32  - 
Lebanon 0.75  0.667  0.9  0.7  0.633  -  -  - 
Liechtenstein 0.75  0.667  0.666  0.5  0.444  -  -  - 
Lithuania 0.75  0.667  0.875  0.688  0.625  4  0.36  - 
Luxembourg 0.667  0.5  1  0.66  0.5 2 0.28  - 
Malta 0.833  0.778  0.75  0.583  0.528  -  -  - 
Mexico  1 1  1  1 1 3  0.17  - 
Monaco 0.667  0.5  1  0.667  0.5  -  -  - 
Netherlands 0.75  0.667  0.75  0.667  0.625  2.5  0.2  2 
New  Zealand 1 1  1  1 1 4  0.95  - 
Norway 0.667  0.556  0.75  0.417  0.305  3.5  0.42  - 
Peru 0.667  0.556  0.667  0.556  0.5  3.5  0.45  - 
Philippines  0.5  0.333  0.5  0.333  0.25 4 0.22  - 
Portugal 0.667  0.556  0.667  0.542  0.472  2.5  0.44  - 
Romania 0.667  0.5  0.875  0.583  0.438  5  0.44  - 
Saudi Arabia  0.5  0.333  0.667  0.333  0.222  -  -  - 
Slovak Rep.  0.75  0.5  0.75  0.5  0.375  3  0.29  - 
South  Africa  1 1  1  1 1 5  0.81  - 
South Korea  0.75  0.667  0.7  0.643  0.611  4.5  0.47  - 
Spain 0.833  0.778  0.667  0.5  0.444  5  0.37  2 
Sri  Lanka  1 1  1  1 1 4  0.39  - 
Sweden 0.75  0.667  1  0.75  0.667  3.5  0.33  3 
Switzerland 0.625  0.5  0.75  0.5  0.417  3  0.27  2 
Taiwan 0.75  0.667  0.75  0.667  0.625  3  0.56  - 
Thailand  1 1  1  1 1 4  0.81  - 
United  Kingdom  1 1  1  1 1 5  0.95 2 
United  States 1 1  1  1 1 3  0.65 2 
Uruguay 0.667  0.5  0.667  0.5  0.438  1  0.18  - 
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Table 2. Inheritance Law Permissiveness: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics on the maximum share that can be bequeathed to a single child in the 
absence or presence of a surviving spouse, for 2 or 3 numbers of children in civil law countries. Panel B 
provides the same statistics for common law countries. Panel C shows the correlation of the maximum share 
that can be bequeathed to a single child with the Revised Anti-Director Index, the Self Dealing Index and the 
ratio of Stock Market Capitalization to GDP drawn from Djankov et al. (2006) and the Legality Index defined 












Mean  0.72 0.63 0.60 0.54 
Standard  deviation  0.09 0.12 0.15 0.16 
Minimum  0.50 0.33 0.33 0.25 












Mean 1  1  0.96  0.96 
Standard deviation  0  0  0.12  0.12 
Minimum 1  1  0.67  0.67 











































 Table 3. Regressions of Family and Non-Family Firms’ Investment 
 
This table presents the estimates of a cross-sectional regression model for 10,245 firms from 32 countries. The dependent variable is the mean of 
the ratio of Capital Expenditure to Total Assets in the previous year. The mean of the ratio is calculated over the period 1990-2006 for all firms for 
which we have at least 6 years of data. The independent variables are as follows: Family Firm is a dummy variable that equals 1 for family firms 
and 0 otherwise; Family Firm × Investor Protection is interaction between the Family Firm dummy variable and a measure of Investor Protection; 
Family Firm × Inheritance Law is the interaction between the Family Firm dummy variable and the maximum share that can be given to a child in 
the presence of a spouse and three children; and Family Firm × Inheritance Law × Investor Protection is the interaction of all three variables. 
Investor Protection is defined as the Revised Anti-Director Rights Index of LLSV (1998) in column 1, the Self Dealing Index of Djankov et al. 
(2008) in column 2, the Anti-Director Rights Index of Spamann (2008) in column 3, and the Creditors’ Rights Index of Djankov et al. (2007) in 
column 4. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. Asterisks (*, ** and ***) indicate statistical significance (at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively). 
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Country and Industry effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R
2 0.2562  0.2714  0.2618  0.2082 
Number of Observations  10,245  10,245  10,245  10,245 
 
  46Table 4. Regressions of Family and Non-Family Firms’ Investment With Financial Dependence 
 
This table presents the estimates of a cross-sectional regression model for 10,245 firms from 32 countries. The dependent variable is the mean of 
the ratio of Capital Expenditure to Total Assets in the previous year and calculated as described in Table 3. The independent variables are as 
follows: Family Firm is a dummy variable that equals 1 for family firms and 0 otherwise; Family Firm × Financial Dependence × Investor 
Protection is the interaction between the Family Firm dummy, Financial Dependence and Investor Protection; Family Firm × Financial 
Dependence × Inheritance Law is the interaction between the Family Firm dummy, Financial Dependence and the maximum share that can be 
given to a child in the presence of a spouse and three children; and Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law × Investor Protection 
is the interaction of all four variables. Financial Dependence is drawn from Rajan and Zingales (1998). Investor Protection is defined as the 
Revised Anti-Director Rights Index of LLSV (1998) in column 1, the Self Dealing Index of Djankov et al. (2008) in column 2, the Anti-Director 
Rights Index of Spamann (2008) in column 3, and the Creditors’ Rights Index of Djankov et al. (2007) in column 4. Standard errors are corrected 
for clustering at the country level. Asterisks (*, ** and ***) indicate statistical significance (at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively). 
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Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 



























Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 









































Country and Industry effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R
2 0.2982  0.3022  0.3184  0.2411 
Number of Observations  10,245  10,245  10,245  10,245 
  47Table 5. Regression Analysis for Family Firms With Succession and Without Succession 
 
This table presents the estimates of a cross-sectional regression model for 9,704 firms from 32 countries. We split the sample in two sub-samples: 
in Panel A, estimation is performed on the sub-sample that includes non-family firms and family firms that experienced a succession over 1985-
2006 period (1,025 family firms); in Panel B, it is performed using a sub-sample that includes all non-family firms and family firms that did not 
experience any succession (1,548 family firms). In both cases we exclude from the sample 541 family firms for which no information on 
succession is available. From Panel A we also exclude 174 family firms that experienced succession where control was handed over from a family 
member to an outside manager. The dependent variable is the mean of the ratio of Capital Expenditure to Total Assets in the previous year. The 
mean of the ratio is calculated over the period 1990-2006 for all firms for which we have at least 6 years of data. The independent variables are 
defined as in Table 4. Investor Protection is defined as the Revised Anti-Director Index of LLSV (1998) in columns 1 and 3, and the Self Dealing 
Index of Djankov et al. (2008) in columns 2 and 4. The other control variables are the following: Log of Initial Market-to-Book; Log of Initial 
Assets; Family Firm × Log of Initial Market-to-Book; Family Firm × Log of Initial Assets. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the 
country level. Asterisks (*, ** and ***) indicate statistical significance (at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively). 
 
 
  Panel A: 
Family Firms With Succession 
 Panel  B: 
Family Firms Without Succession 
 1  2    3  4 




























Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 



























Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 









Country and Industry effects  YES  YES    YES  YES 
Other Control Variables (see table legend)  YES  YES    YES  YES 
          
Adjusted R
2 0.3288  0.3415    0.2604  0.2529 
Number of Observations  7,982  7,982    8,679  8,679 
 
 
  48Table 6. Capital Expenditure in Family Firms Around Succession 
 
This table presents the estimates of a cross-sectional regression model for 1,025 family firms from 32 countries that experienced succession over 
the period 1985-2006. The dependent variable is the ratio of Capital Expenditure to Total Assets in the previous year. The independent variables 
are as follows: Succession is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 from the year before succession until the end of the sample period and the 
value of 0 for all the years before; Succession × Investor Protection is the interaction between the Succession dummy variable and Investor 
Protection; Succession × Inheritance Law is the interaction between the Succession dummy variable and the maximum share that can be given to a 
child in the presence of a spouse and three children; and Succession × Inheritance Law × Investor Protection is the interaction of all three 
variables. Investor Protection is defined as the Revised Anti-Director Rights Index of LLSV (1998) in column 1, the Self Dealing Index of 
Djankov et al. (2008) in column 2, the Anti-Director Rights Index of Spamann (2008) in column 3, and the Creditors’ Rights Index of Djankov et 
al. (2006) in column 4. Asterisks (*, ** and ***) indicate statistical significance (at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively). 
 
 



































Fixed firm effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Calendar year effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
        
Adjusted R
2 0.1628  0.1644  0.1681  0.1474 
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Table 7. Regression of Family and Non-Family Firms Sales Growth 
 
This table presents the estimates of a cross-sectional regression model for 7,659 firms from 32 countries. The dependent variable is the mean of 
sales growth in percentage terms. The mean of the growth rate is calculated over the period 1990-2006 for all firms for which we have at least 7 
consecutive years of sales data. The independent variables are as defined in Table 4. Investor Protection is defined as the Revised Anti-Director 
Rights Index of LLSV (1998) in column 1, the Self Dealing Index of Djankov et al. (2008) in column 2, the Anti-Director Rights Index of 
Spamann (2008) in column 3, and the Creditors’ Rights Index of Djankov et al. (2007) in column 4. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at 
the country level. Asterisks (*, ** and ***) indicate statistical significance (at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively). 
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Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 



























Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 











































Country and Industry effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R
2 0.1725  0.1587  0.1604  0.1407 
Number of Observations  7,659  7,659  7,659  7,659 
 Table 8. Robustness Checks 
 
This table presents several robustness checks of the estimates reported in Table 4 using the same specification. 
Variables are also defined as in Table 4. In Panel A we include Inheritance Tax which is defined as the top marginal 
transfer rate from parent to children data and is drawn from the Coopers and Lybrand International Tax Summaries. 
In Panel B the estimates are performed only for companies incorporated in Civil Law countries, as defined by 
Djankov et al. (2008). In Panel C they are repeated with two different definitions of family firms: in Panel C.1 they 
are defined as firms in which a family blockholder owns at least a 20 percent share and participates in the firm’s 
active management, while in Panel C.2 they are defined as firms in which a family blockholder owns at least a 5 
percent stake. All regressions include country and industry dummies. In Panel D we repeat the estimation with a size-
dependent measure of Financial Dependence, obtained splitting U.S. companies present in Compustat into three sub-
samples respectively formed by large, medium and small firms, and computing financial dependence for the median 
company in each sub-sample. In Panels A to D Investor Protection is defined as the Revised Anti-Director Index in 
column 1, and the Self Dealing Index in column 2.  The other control variables are the following: Family Firm; Log 
of Initial Market-to-Book; Log of Initial Assets; Family Firm × Log of Initial Market-to-Book; and Family Firm × 
Log of Initial Assets. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. Asterisks (*, ** and ***) 
indicate statistical significance (at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively). 
 
Panel A. Controlling for Inheritance Taxes 
 
 1  2 












Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 























Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 





Country and Industry effects  YES  YES 
Other Control Variables (see table legend)  YES  YES 
    
Adjusted R
2 0.3410  0.3526 
Number of Observations  10,245  10,245 
 
  51Table 8, continued 
Panel B. Civil Law Countries Only 
 
 1  2 












Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 















Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 





Country and industry effects  YES  YES 
Control Variables (see table legend)  YES  YES 
    
Adjusted R
2 0.1605  0.1618 
Number of Observations  6,721  6,721 
 
Panel C.1 Different Definitions of Family Firms 
 
  Blockholder owns at least of 20% 
and present in management 
 1  2 












Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 















Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 





Country and industry effects  YES  YES 
Control Variables (see table legend)  YES  YES 
    
Adjusted R
2 0.3102  0.3015 
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Table 8, continued 
Panel C.2 Different Definitions of Family Firms 
 
  Family Blockholder owns at least of 5%
 1  2 












Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 















Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 





Country and industry effects  YES  YES 
Control Variables (see table legend)  YES  YES 
    
Adjusted R
2 0.2692  0.2702 




Panel D. Different Definitions of Financial Dependence 
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Family Firm × Financial Dependence  × Inheritance 















Financial Dependence  × Inheritance Law 





Country and industry effects  YES  YES 
Control Variables (see table legend)  YES  YES 
    
Adjusted R
2 0.3215  0.3285 
Number of Observations  10,245  10,245 
 
 
 Table A1. Company Data: Sample Description 
 
Panel A. Geographical Distribution of the Sample 
 
 








Argentina 18  31    Japan 1,358  180 
Australia 428  158    Mexico  39  47 
Austria 65  34    Netherlands  70  45 
Belgium 70  32    New  Zealand  38  11 
Brazil 81  108    Norway  155  54 
Canada 341  85    Peru  14  17 
Colombia 14  18    Philippines  67  58 
Denmark 62  45    Portugal  44  35 
Finland 115  94    South  Africa  38  20 
France 491  352    South  Korea  184  205 
Germany 581  381    Spain  326  248 
Greece 16  35    Sweden  170  115 
India 31  68    Switzerland  135  102 
Ireland 95  22    Taiwan  70  78 
Israel 98  41    Thailand  49  141 
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Panel B. Industrial Classification of Sample Firms 
 










Apparel (322)  60  171    Other industries (390)  570  165 
Basics ex. fert. (3511)  65  58    Paper products (341)  53  88 
Beverage (313)  129  49    Petroleum and coal products (354)  148  21 
Drugs (3522)  325  25    Petroleum refining (353)  157  25 
Electric machinery (383)  362  145    Plastic products (356)  281  112 
Food products (311)  421  295    Pottery (361)  152  118 
Footwear (324)  47  51    Printing and publishing (342)  171  135 
Furniture (332)  140  129    Professional goods (385)  430  74 
Glass (362)  114  102    Pulp paper (3411)  209  157 
Iron and steel (371)  347  74    Radio (3832)  94  42 
Leather (323)  90  104    Rubber products (355)  82  105 
Machinery (382)  238  91    Ship (3841)  118  72 
Metal products (381)  244  98    Spinning (3211)  50  74 
Motor vehicle (3843)  115  42    Synthetic resins (3513)  114  45 
Non-ferrous metal (372)  140  97    Textiles (321)  195  155 
Non-metal products (369)  215  81    Tobacco (314)  76  11 
Office and computing (3825)  122  87    Transportation equipment (384)  255  34 

















control to heir 1 
and gives x ≥ u 
to heir 2. 
t = 0  t = 1  t = 2 
Heir 1 raises 
funds to fund 
investment I. 
• Firm produces 
revenue R. 
• Heir 1 diverts a 
fraction φ of R as 
private benefits. 
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Figure 2. Family firm investment, investor protection (1 φ − )  













Figure 3. Investment (ratio of CAPEX to total assets) in family firms  
around the succession year 
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